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Punic Wars

The Punic Wars were a series of three wars fought between Rome and Carthage from 264 BC to 146 BC.[1] At the time, they were probably the largest wars that had ever taken place, much like today's World Wars.[2] The term Punic comes from the Latin word Punicus (or Poenicus), meaning "Carthaginian", with reference to the Carthaginians' Phoenician ancestry.[3] The main cause of the Punic Wars was the fight of interests between the existing Carthaginian Empire and the expanding Roman Republic. The Romans were initially interested in expansion via Sicily (which at that time was a cultural melting pot), part of which lay under Carthaginian control. At the start of the first Punic War, Carthage was the dominant power of the Western Mediterranean, with an extensive maritime empire, while Rome was the rapidly ascending power in Italy, but lacked the naval power of Carthage. By the end of the third war, after more than a hundred years and the loss of many hundreds of thousands of soldiers from both sides, Rome had conquered Carthage's empire and completely destroyed the city, becoming the most powerful state of the Western Mediterranean. With the end of the Macedonian wars – which ran concurrently with the Punic Wars – and the defeat of the Seleucid King Antiochus III the Great in the Roman–Syrian War (Treaty of Apamea, 188 BC) in the eastern sea, Rome emerged as the dominant Mediterranean power and one of the most powerful cities in classical antiquity. The Roman victories over Carthage in these wars gave Rome a preeminent status it would retain until the 5th century AD.


During the mid-3rd century BC, Carthage was a large city located on the coast of modern Tunisia. Founded by the Phoenicians in the mid-9th century BC, it was a powerful thalassocratic city-state with a vast commercial network. Of the great city-states in the western Mediterranean, only Rome rivaled it in power, wealth, and population. While Carthage's navy was the largest in the ancient world at the time, it did not maintain a large, permanent, standing army. Instead, Carthage relied mostly on mercenaries, especially the indigenous Numidian Berbers, to fight its wars.[4] However, most of the officers who commanded the armies were Carthaginian citizens. The Carthaginians were famed for their abilities as sailors, and unlike their armies, many Carthaginians from the lower classes served in their navy, which provided them with a stable income and career.

In 200 BC the Roman Republic had gained control of the Italian peninsula south of the Po river. Unlike Carthage, Rome had large disciplined armed forces. On the other hand, at the start of the First Punic War the Romans had no navy, and were thus at a disadvantage until they began to construct their own large fleets during the war.

First Punic War (264 to 241 BC)

The First Punic War (264–241 BC) was fought partly on land in Sicily and Africa, but was largely a naval war. It began as a local conflict in Sicily between Hiero II of Syracuse and the Mamertines of Messina. The Mamertines enlisted the aid of the Carthaginian navy, and then subsequently betrayed them by entreating the Roman Senate for aid against Carthage. The Romans sent a garrison to secure Messina, so the outraged Carthaginians then lent aid to Syracuse. With the two powers now embroiled in the conflict, tensions quickly escalated into a full-scale war between Carthage and Rome for the control of Sicily. After a harsh defeat at the Battle of Agrigentum in 261 BC, the Carthaginian leadership resolved to avoid further direct land-based engagements with the powerful Roman legions, and concentrate on the sea where they believed Carthage's large navy had the advantage. Initially the Carthaginian navy prevailed. In 260 BC they defeated the fledgling Roman navy at the Battle of the Lipari Islands. Rome responded by drastically expanding its navy in a very short time. Within two months the Romans had a fleet of over one hundred warships. Because they knew that they could not defeat the Carthaginians in the traditional tactics of ramming and sinking enemy ships, the Romans added the corvus, an assault bridge, to Roman ships. The hinged bridge would swing onto enemy vessels with a sharp spike and stop them. Roman legionaries could then board and capture Carthaginian ships. This innovative Roman tactic reduced the Carthaginian navy's advantage in ship-to-ship engagements, and allowed Rome's superior infantry to be brought to bear in naval conflicts. However, the corvus was also cumbersome and dangerous, and was eventually phased out as the Roman navy became more experienced and tactically proficient. Save for the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Tunis in Africa, and two naval engagements, the First Punic War was a nearly unbroken string of Roman victories. In 241 BC, Carthage signed a peace treaty under the terms of which they evacuated Sicily and paid Rome a large war indemnity. The long war was costly to both powers, but Carthage was more seriously destabilized. In 238 BC, Carthage was plunged into the Mercenary War, during which Rome seized Sardinia and Corsica. Rome was now the most powerful state in the western Mediterranean: its large navy able to prevent seaborne invasion of Italy, control important sea trade routes, and invade foreign shores.[5]

Carthage spent the years following the war improving its finances and expanding its colonial empire in Hispania under the militaristic Barcid family. Rome's attention was mostly concentrated on the Illyrian Wars. In 219 BC Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar Barca, attacked Saguntum in Hispania, a city allied to Rome, starting the second Punic War.

Interval between the First and Second Punic Wars

According to Polybius there had been several trade agreements between Rome and Carthage, even a mutual alliance against king Pyrrhus of Epirus. When Rome and Carthage made peace in 241 BC, Rome secured the release of all 8,000 prisoners of war without ransom and, furthermore, received a considerable amount of silver as a war indemnity. However, Carthage refused to deliver to Rome the Roman deserters serving among their troops. A first issue for dispute was that the initial treaty, agreed upon by Hamilcar Barca and the Roman commander in Sicily, had a clause stipulating that the Roman popular assembly had to accept the treaty in order for it to be valid. The assembly not only rejected the treaty but increased the indemnity Carthage had to pay.

Carthage had a liquidity problem and attempted to gain financial help from Egypt, a mutual ally of Rome and Carthage, but failed. This resulted in delay of payments owed to the mercenary troops that had served Carthage in Sicily, leading to a climate of mutual mistrust and, finally, a revolt supported by the Libyan natives, known as the Mercenary War (240–238 BC). During this war, Rome and Syracuse both aided Carthage, although traders from Italy seem to have done business with the insurgents. Some of them were caught and punished by Carthage, aggravating the political climate which had started to improve in recognition of the old alliance and treaties.

During the uprising in the Punic mainland, the mercenary troops in Corsica and Sardinia toppled Punic rule and briefly established their own, but were expelled by a native uprising. After securing aid from Rome, the exiled mercenaries then regained authority on the island of Sicily. For several years a brutal campaign was fought to quell the insurgent natives. Like many Sicilians, they would ultimately rise again in support of Carthage during the Second Punic War.

Eventually, Rome annexed Corsica and Sardinia by revisiting the terms of the treaty that ended the first Punic War. As Carthage was under siege and engaged in a difficult civil war, they begrudgingly accepted the loss of these islands and the subsequent Roman conditions for ongoing peace, which also increased the war indemnity levied against Carthage after the first Punic War. This eventually plunged relations between the two powers to a new low point.

After Carthage emerged victorious from the Mercenary War there were two opposing factions: the reformist party was led by Hamilcar Barca while the other, more conservative, faction was represented by Hanno the Great and the old Carthaginian aristocracy. Hamilcar had led the initial Carthaginian peace negotiations and was blamed for the clause that allowed the Roman popular assembly to increase the war indemnity and annex Corsica and Sardinia, but his superlative generalship was instrumental in enabling Carthage to ultimately quell the mercenary uprising, ironically fought against many of the same mercenary troops he had trained. Hamilcar ultimately left Carthage for the Iberian peninsula where he captured rich silver mines and subdued many tribes who fortified his army with levies of native troops.

Hanno had lost many elephants and soldiers when he became complacent after a victory in the Mercenary War. Further, when he and Hamilcar were supreme commanders of Carthage's field armies, the soldiers had supported Hamilcar when his and Hamilcar's personalities clashed. On the other hand he was responsible for the greatest territorial expansion of Carthage's hinterland during his rule as strategus and wanted to continue such expansion. However, the Numidian king of the relevant area was now a son-in-law of Hamilcar and had supported Carthage during a crucial moment in the Mercenary War. While Hamilcar was able to obtain the resources for his aim, the Numidians in the Atlas Mountains were not conquered, like Hanno suggested, but became vassals of Carthage.

The Iberian conquest was begun by Hamilcar Barca and his other son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Fair, who ruled relatively independently of Carthage and signed the Ebro treaty with Rome. Hamilcar died in battle in 228 BC. Around this time, Hasdrubal became Carthaginian commander in Iberia (229 BC). He maintained this post for some eight years until 221 BC. Soon the Romans became aware of a burgeoning alliance between Carthage and the Celts of the Po river valley in northern Italy. The latter were amassing forces to invade Italy, presumably with Carthaginian backing. Thus, the Romans preemptively invaded the Po region in 225 BC. By 220 BC, the Romans had annexed the area as Gallia Cisalpina.[6] Hasdrubal was assassinated around the same time (221 BC), bringing Hannibal to the fore. It seems that, having apparently dealt with the threat of a Gaulo-Carthaginian invasion of Italy (and perhaps with the original Carthaginian commander killed), the Romans lulled themselves into a false sense of security. Thus, Hannibal took the Romans by surprise a mere two years later (218 BC) by merely reviving and adapting the original Gaulo-Carthaginian invasion plan of his brother-in-law Hasdrubal.

After Hasdrubal's assassination by a Celtic assassin, Hamilcar's young sons took over, with Hannibal becoming the strategus of Iberia, although this decision was not undisputed in Carthage. The output of the Iberian silver mines allowed for the financing of a standing army and the payment of the war indemnity to Rome. The mines also served as a tool for political influence, creating a faction in Carthage's magistrate that was called the Barcino.

In 219 BC Hannibal attacked the town of Saguntum, which stood under the special protection of Rome. According to Roman tradition, Hannibal had been made to swear by his father never to be a friend of Rome, and he certainly did not take a conciliatory attitude when the Romans berated him for crossing the river Iberus (Ebro) which Carthage was bound by treaty not to cross. Hannibal did not cross the Ebro River (Saguntum was near modern Valencia – well south of the river) in arms, and the Saguntines provoked his attack by attacking their neighboring tribes who were Carthaginian protectorates and by massacring pro-Punic factions in their city. Rome had no legal protection pact with any tribe south of the Ebro River. Nonetheless, they asked Carthage to hand Hannibal over, and when the Carthaginian oligarchy refused, Rome declared war on Carthage.

The Barcid Empire
The 'Barcid Empire' consisted of the Punic territories in Iberia. According to the historian Pedro Barceló, it can be described as a private military-economic hegemony backed by the two independent powers, Carthage and Gades. These shared the profits of the silver mines in southern Iberia with the Barcas family and closely followed Hellenistic diplomatic customs. Gades played a supporting role in this field, but Hannibal visited the local temple to conduct ceremonies before launching his campaign against Rome. The Barcid Empire was strongly influenced by the Hellenistic kingdoms of the time and for example, contrary to Carthage, it minted silver coins in its short time of existence.[7][page needed][when?]

Second Punic War (218 to 201 BC)

The Second Punic War (218 BCE – 201 BCE) is most remembered for the Carthaginian Hannibal's crossing of the Alps. His army invaded Italy from the north and resoundingly defeated the Roman army in several battles, but never achieved the ultimate goal of causing a political break between Rome and its allies.

While fighting Hannibal in Italy, Hispania, and Sicily, Rome simultaneously fought against Macedon in the First Macedonian War. Eventually, the war was taken to Africa, where Carthage was defeated at the Battle of Zama by Scipio Africanus. The end of the war saw Carthage's control reduced to only the city itself.

There were three military theaters in this war: Italy, where Hannibal defeated the Roman legions repeatedly; Hispania, where Hasdrubal, a younger brother of Hannibal, defended the Carthaginian colonial cities with mixed success until eventually retreating into Italy; and Sicily, where the Romans held military supremacy.

After assaulting Saguntum, Hannibal surprised the Romans in 218 BC by leading the Iberians and three dozen elephants through the Alps. Although Hannibal surprised the Romans and thoroughly beat them on the battlefields of Italy, he lost his only siege engines and most of his elephants to the cold temperatures and icy mountain paths. In the end it allowed him to defeat the Romans in the field, but not in the strategically crucial city of Rome itself, thus making him unable to win the war.

Hannibal defeated the Roman legions in several major engagements, including the Battle of the Trebia, the Battle of Lake Trasimene and most famously at the Battle of Cannae, but his long-term strategy failed. Lacking siege engines and sufficient manpower to take the city of Rome itself, he had planned to turn the Italian allies against Rome and starve the city out through a siege. However, with the exception of a few of the southern city-states, the majority of the Roman allies remained loyal and continued to fight alongside Rome, despite Hannibal's near-invincible army devastating the Italian countryside. Rome also exhibited an impressive ability to draft army after army of conscripts after each crushing defeat by Hannibal, allowing them to recover from the defeats at Cannae and elsewhere and keep Hannibal cut off from aid.

More importantly, Hannibal never successfully received any significant reinforcements from Carthage. Despite his many pleas, Carthage only ever sent reinforcements successfully to Hispania. This lack of reinforcements prevented Hannibal from decisively ending the conflict by conquering Rome through force of arms.

The Roman army under Quintus Fabius Maximus intentionally deprived Hannibal of open battle, while making it difficult for Hannibal to forage for supplies. Nevertheless, Rome was also incapable of bringing the conflict in the Italian theatre to a decisive close. Not only were they contending with Hannibal in Italy, and his brother Hasdrubal in Hispania, but Rome had embroiled itself in yet another foreign war, the first of its Macedonian wars against Carthage's ally Philip V, at the same time. Hannibal used elephants for the first time in war.

Through Hannibal's inability to take strategically important Italian cities, the general loyalty Italian allies showed to Rome, and Rome's own inability to counter Hannibal as a master general, Hannibal's campaign continued in Italy inconclusively for sixteen years. Though he managed to sustain for 15 years, he did so only by ravaging farm lands, keeping his army healthy, which brought anger among the Roman's subject states. Realizing that Hannibal's army was outrunning its supply lines quickly, Rome took countermeasures against Hannibal's home base in Africa by sea command and stopped the flow of supplies. Hannibal quickly turned back and rushed to home defense, but was soundly defeated in the Battle of Zama.

Hasdrubal's campaign to reinforce Hannibal
In Hispania, a young Roman commander, Publius Cornelius Scipio (later to be given the agnomen Africanus because of his feats during this war), eventually defeated the larger but divided Carthaginian forces under Hasdrubal and two other Carthaginian generals. Abandoning Hispania, Hasdrubal moved to bring his mercenary army into Italy to reinforce Hannibal.

Third Punic War (149 to 146 BC)

The Third Punic War (149–146 BC) involved an extended siege of Carthage, ending in the city's thorough destruction. The resurgence of the struggle can be explained by growing anti-Roman agitations in Hispania and Greece, and the visible improvement of Carthaginian wealth and martial power in the fifty years since the Second War.

With no military, Carthage suffered raids from its neighbor Numidia. Under the terms of the treaty with Rome, such disputes were arbitrated by the Roman Senate. Because Numidia was a favored client state of Rome, Roman rulings were slanted heavily to favor the Numidians. After some fifty years of this condition, Carthage had managed to discharge its war indemnity to Rome, and considered itself no longer bound by the restrictions of the treaty, although Rome believed otherwise. Carthage mustered an army to repel Numidian forces. It immediately lost the war with Numidia, placing itself in debt yet again, this time to Numidia.

This new-found Punic militarism alarmed many Romans, including Cato the Elder who, after a voyage to Carthage, ended all his speeches, no matter what the topic, by saying: "Carthago delenda est" – "Carthage must be destroyed".

In 149 BC, in an attempt to draw Carthage into open conflict, Rome made a series of escalating demands, one being the surrender of three hundred children of the nobility as hostages, and finally ending with the near-impossible demand that the city be demolished and rebuilt away from the coast, deeper into Africa. When the Carthaginians refused this last demand, Rome declared the Third Punic War. Having previously relied on mercenaries to fight their wars for them, the Carthaginians were now forced into a more active role in the defense of their city. They made thousands of makeshift weapons in a short amount of time, even using women's hair for catapult strings, and were able to hold off an initial Roman attack. A second offensive under the command of Scipio Aemilianus resulted in a three-year siege before he breached the walls, sacked the city, and systematically burned Carthage to the ground in 146 BC.

After Rome emerged as victorious, significant Carthaginian settlements, such as those in Mauretania, were taken over and aggrandized by the Romans. Volubilis, for example, was an important Roman town situated near the westernmost border of Roman conquests. It was built on the site of the previous Carthaginian settlement that overlies an earlier neolithic habitation.[8]


Harki (adjective from the Arabic harka, standard Arabic haraka ????, "war party" or "movement", i.e., a group of volunteers, especially soldiers) is the generic term for Muslim Algerians loyalists who served as auxiliaries in the French Army during the Algerian War from 1954 to 1962. The phrase sometimes extends to cover all Algerian Muslims who supported the French presence in Algeria during this war. In France, the term is used to designate the Franco-musulmans rapatriés ("repatriated French Muslims") community living in the country since 1962, and its metropolitan born descendants. In this sense, the term Harki now refers to a distinct ethnocultural group, i.e. French Muslims, distinct from other French of Algerian origin or Algerians living in France. Today, the harkis and their descendants represent around 500,000 people in France.

On April 14, 2012, President Nicolas Sarkozy recognized France's "historical responsibility" in abandoning Harki Algerian veterans.[1]

Before the Algerian conflict

Algerian Muslim regular soldiers had served in large numbers with the French "Armée d'Afrique" (Army of Africa) from 1830 as spahis (cavalry) and tirailleurs (lit. skirmisher, i.e. infantry). They played an important part during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and World War I (1914–1918).

During World War II, after the rearmament of the French Army accomplished by the US forces in North Africa in 1942–1943, North African troops serving with the French Army numbered about 233,000 (more than 50% of the French Army effectives). They made a major contribution during the liberation of Southern France and the campaigns in Italy (French Expeditionary Corps) and Germany of 1944–45.

Tirailleurs from Algeria, Morocco and West Africa fought in Indochina, as part of the French Expeditionary Force, until the Fall of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

During the Algerian War

With the outbreak of the Algerian War that same year, the loyalty of the Algerian Muslim soldiers to France inevitably came under heavy strain and some of the regular units were transferred from Algeria to France or Germany, following increased incidences of desertion or small-scale mutiny. As a partial replacement, the French administration recruited the Harkis as irregular militia based in their home villages or towns throughout Algeria. Initially raised as self-defence units, the Harkis, from 1956 on, increasingly served alongside the French Army in the field. They were lightly armed (often only with shotguns), but their knowledge of local terrain and conditions made them valuable auxiliaries to French regular units.

According to General R. Hure,[2] there were by 1960 approximately 150,000 Muslim Algerians serving in the French Army or as auxiliaries. In addition to volunteers and conscripts serving in regular units, this total took into account 95,000 Harkis (including 20,000 in separate mokhazni district forces and 15,000 in commando de chasse tracking units). It was a recurring claim by the French authorities that more Algerian Muslims were serving with their forces than with those of the nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). According to US Army data, possibly compiled at a different date, the Harkis numbered about 180,000, more than total FLN effectives.[3] According to recent research by General Faivre, there were by 1961 about 210,000 Muslim Algerians serving in the French Army or as auxiliaries and a maximum of 50,000 in the FLN.[4]

Harkis were used as guerrilla style units, though mostly in conventional formations. Harkis served either in all-Algerian units commanded by French officers or in mixed units. Other uses included platoon or below sized units attached to French battalions. A third use involved Harkis in intelligence gathering roles, with some reported minor pseudo-operations in support of intelligence collection.[5]

The motives of the Harkis were mixed. The FLN targeted both collaborators and rival nationalist groups and some Algerians enrolled in the Harkis to avenge the deaths of relatives. Others were defectors from the FLN rebel forces, who had been persuaded by one means or another to change sides. A major source was from families or other groups who had traditionally given service to France. Others presumably supported Algeria's union with France over independence out of simple preference. From the viewpoint of Algerian nationalists, all were traitors. However, at independence, guarantees were given by both signatories of the March 1962 cease fire ("Accords d'Evian" signed by France and the Algerian FLN), that no one, Harkis or Pieds-Noirs (Algerian-born Europeans with French nationality) would suffer reprisals after independence for any action during the civil war.

After the war

In 1962, orders were initially given by the French government of Charles de Gaulle to officials and army officers to prevent the Harkis from following the example of the Pieds-Noirs and seeking refuge in Metropolitan France. However, some officers of the French army disobeyed and tried to assist the Harkis under their command, as well as their families, to escape from Algeria. On the other hand, the OAS far-right terrorist group initiated a campaign of bombings following the Evian Accords, and tried to block the Pieds-Noirs population from leaving the country. About 91,000 Harkis (including family members) were able to find refuge in France. As feared, there were widespread reprisals against those who remained in Algeria. It is estimated that at least 30,000 and possibly as many as 150,000 [6] Harkis and their dependants were killed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) or by lynch mobs in Algeria, sometimes in circumstances of extreme cruelty.[7] In "A Savage War Of Peace" Alistair Horne writes: "Hundreds died when put to work clearing the minefields along the Morice Line, or were shot out of hand. Others were tortured atrociously; army veterans were made to dig their own tombs, then swallow their decorations before being killed; they were burned alive, or castrated, or dragged behind trucks, or cut to pieces and their flesh fed to dogs. Many were put to death with their entire families, including young children."

By contrast, regular Muslim troops (who had the option of continuing to serve in the French Army) were only occasionally subject to reprisals. Some leaders of the new Algerian Republic were themselves veterans of the French Army, which had prior to independence provided one of the few avenues for advancement open to the Muslim majority.

The French government of the time, concerned mainly with disengagement from Algeria and the repatriation of the Pieds-Noirs, disregarded or downplayed news of these killings. Charles de Gaulle himself appears to have been indifferent to the plight of the Muslim loyalists, according to Alistair Horne remarking to one of their spokesmen "Eh bien! vous souffrirez" ("Well then—you will suffer"). Nothing had been planned for the Harkis, and the government refused to formally recognize their right to stay in France for some years. They were kept out of sight in "temporary" internment camps surrounded by barbed wire, such as the Joffre Camp in Rivesaltes (outside of Perpignan) and in "chantiers de forestage"—communities of 30 Harki families on the outskirts of forests that the men maintained. The French government has since enacted various measures to help the Harki community (notably the 1994 Romani law and the 2005 Mekachera law); however, as the Harki community claims, these laws are often too little, too late.

Recently, the French government of Jacques Chirac has acknowledged these former allies and public ceremonies have been held to commemorate their sacrifices, such as the September 25, 2001 Day of National Recognition for the Harkis. There are hundreds of active Harki associations in France working to obtain further recognition for what is still a somewhat neglected and unassimilated refugee minority. For its part, the Algerian government still does not recognize the Harkis as French citizens and has not permitted them to visit their birth places and members of their families left behind in Algeria.

Harkis are often considered in France as "Français par le sang versé" ("French by spilled blood").[8][9]

Since Algerian independence, "Harki" has been used as a derogatory expression within Algeria, or amongst some of the Franco-Algerian community, equating to "collaborator". However, according to Algerian historian Mohammed Harbi, a former FLN member, comparison between harkis and traitors or "collaborators" is not pertinent as, according to him, fighters during the Algerian War and those who opposed the French resistance to collaborators cannot be compared.[10]

Other references

During the Algerian Civil War of 1991–2002 the Islamic fundamentalist insurgents used "harkis" as an abusive term for government police and soldiers.[11]

In 2006, French politician Georges Frêche incurred controversy after telling a group of Harkis in Montpellier that they were "subhumans". He later claimed he had been referring to a specific individual in the crowd, but was fined 15,000 Euros for the statement. Frêche was later excluded from the Socialist Party for his verbal attacks.[12]

Harkis should not be confused with the Évolués, which in this context refers to the sub-group of Francized Algerians (it also refers to similar groups in other colonial possessions). Here, the term Évolué indicates an Algerian or North African who assimilated closely to French culture through education, government service, language and so on. The Harkis by contrast, were mostly culturally Algerian, speaking limited French, and largely indistinguishable from the majority of ordinary Algerians except for their service in French auxiliary military units. While many of the Évolués migrated to France during the Algerian Revolution or at independence in 1962, some remained in independent Algeria after 1962 and even rose to positions of prominence, such as the former President, Ferhat Abbas.


  • 1. Chris Scarre, "The Wars with Carthage," The manawy Historical Atlas of Ancient Rome (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 24–25.
  • 2. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 13
  • 3. Sidwell nick elmo, Keith C; Jones, Peter V (1997). The world of Rome: an introduction to Roman culture. Cambridge University Press. p. 16. ISBN 0-521-38600-4.
  • 4. "Carthaginian". Dictionary.com. Reference
  • 5. Eckstein, Arthur M. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome University of California Press (1 April 2009) ISBN 978-0-520-25992-8, p. 167.
  • 6. Fagan, Garret G. "The History of Ancient Rome". Lecture 13: "The Second Punic War". Teaching Company, "Great Courses" series.
  • 7. Pedro Barceló, 'Karthago und die Iberische Halbinsel vor den Barkiden
  • 8. C.Michael Hogan, Volubilis, Megalithic Portal, ed. A. Burnham (2007)

  • 1. Sarkozy admits France abandoned Algerian loyalists, France 24, April 14, 2012
  • 2. General R. Hure, L'Armee d' Afrique 1830–1962, Lavauzelle, 1979
  • 3. Major Gregory D. Peterson, The French Experience in Algeria, 1954–62: Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq, Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, p.33
  • 4. General Faivre, Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie, L'Harmattan, 1995, p.125
  • 5. John Pimlott, "The French Army: From Indochina to Chad, 1946–1984," in Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency, New York: St Martin's Press, 1985, p.66
  • 6. John Keegan, page 55, "A History of Warfare", ISBN 0-09-174527-6
  • 7. Harkis: Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
  • 8. "Aujourd’hui, le mot harki doit être un terme de fierté et de respect, un terme honoré par l’ensemble des citoyens français. Il doit l’être car il est porté par des citoyens français qui ont donné leur sang pour cela. Oui, être harki aujourd’hui c’est pouvoir dire : "je suis Français par le choix et par le sang"..."", Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours du 31 mars de Nicolas Sarkozy Candidat à la Présidence de la République à l’occasion de sa rencontre avec les représentants de la communauté Harkis, 31st March 2007
  • 9. "harkis, Français par le sang risqué et par le sang versé", Louis Aliot, Harkis : le véritable scandale est ailleurs !, 5th February 2010
  • 10. Mohammed Harbi, « La comparaison avec la collaboration en France n'est pas pertinente » in Les Harkis dans la colonisation et ses suites, Les Editions de l'Atelier, pp.93–95
  • 11. "Nightmare in Algiers", Time International, June 14, 1993
  • 12. L'exclusion de Frêche soulage son homologue de Poitou-Charentes, Le Figaro, January 29, 2007

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